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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.  
 
William Tyson was indicted for the transportation of a 
minor to engage in prostitution and the production of child 
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) and 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(a), respectively. During pre-trial proceedings, the 
District Court granted the Government’s motion in limine to 
exclude mistake-of-age evidence. Tyson and the Government 
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then submitted a conditional plea agreement preserving his 
right to appeal the District Court’s order. The District Court 
sentenced Tyson to concurrent terms of 180 months’ 
imprisonment for each count. 
 
Tyson appeals the District Court’s grant of the 
Government’s motion in limine precluding him from 
introducing mistake-of-age evidence at trial. He argues that the 
District Court erred in precluding the evidence because 
knowledge of age is an element of § 2423(a) and § 2251(a). He 
also urges us to read an affirmative defense on lack of 
knowledge into each statute. We disagree. The statutes’ text, 
context, and history make it clear that knowledge of age is not 
an element and mistake of age is not a defense. Therefore, we 
will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 
I.  
 
In August 2017, Tyson contacted a seventeen-year-old 
female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. After 
communicating for several days via Facebook and text 
messages, Tyson traveled from Pennsylvania to New York 
City. Tyson picked up the victim and her friend and brought 
them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. He then rented several 
rooms at a Motel 6 in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania between 
August 15 and August 20, 2017. Phone records reveal that 
Harrisburg-area individuals contacted the victim to engage in 
commercial sexual activity. 
 
On August 22, 2017, after a relative of Tyson brought 
the victim to a Quality Inn in New Cumberland, FBI agents and 
local law enforcement recovered her during a sting operation. 
Investigators interviewed her and reviewed her phone. They 
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found an August 20, 2017 video of the victim performing oral 
sex on an adult male in a Motel 6 room. The victim identified 
the man in the video as “Real,” whom the investigators 
identified as Tyson. 
 
On October 18, 2017, Tyson was indicted for 
knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution in 
violation of § 2423(a) and producing child pornography in 
violation of § 2251(a). Before trial, the Government filed a 
motion in limine to prohibit Tyson “from eliciting evidence to 
establish ‘mistake of age’” and from asserting “mistake of age” 
as an affirmative defense. App. 21. The District Court granted 
the motion on July 11, 2018. The Court found that evidence of 
mistake of age is irrelevant to § 2423(a) and § 2251(a) because 
the statutes do not require proof of defendants’ knowledge that 
the victim was a minor. As a result, the Court excluded the 
evidence because “its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a risk that the evidence will result in unfair 
prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury” under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See App. 10. 
 
Tyson and the Government subsequently entered a plea 
agreement. According to its terms, Tyson and the Government 
agreed to recommend to the District Court that the sentences 
be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ 
imprisonment. The agreement also preserved Tyson’s right to 
appeal the District Court’s July 11, 2018 order granting the 
Government’s motion in limine. On December 19, 2018, the 
District Court sentenced Tyson to 180 months’ imprisonment 
for each count, to be served concurrently. Tyson filed a Notice 
of Appeal with this Court on December 24, 2018 challenging 
the District Court’s order. 
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II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. §3742(a). 
 
This Court reviews decisions on the admissibility of 
evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Higdon, 638 
F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011). District court conclusions on 
whether “the risk of unfair prejudice does not substantially 
outweigh the probative value of otherwise admissible 
evidence” are reviewed under the same standard. Id. We 
exercise plenary review over legal questions and district court 
rulings based on interpretations of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. See United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 160–61 
(3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 
n.14 (3d Cir. 2000). Statutory construction determinations are 
reviewed de novo. United States v. Cochran, 17 F.3d 56, 57 
(3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
 
III. 
 
Tyson posits that the District Court erred in prohibiting 
evidence related to mistake of age because § 2423(a) and § 
2251(a) require knowledge that the victim was a minor to find 
a defendant guilty. He characterizes knowledge of age as an 
element of each statute. Tyson points to title 18, section 5902 
of the Pennsylvania Statutes and Consolidated Statutes to 
suggest that Pennsylvania law provides a mistake-of-age 
defense to a prosecution based on § 2423(a). Tyson also turns 
to a Ninth Circuit decision interpreting § 2251(a) to require a 
mistake-of-age defense to correct the statute’s supposed 
constitutional deficiencies. We disagree and join the 
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overwhelming majority of our sister circuits holding that 
mistake of age is not a defense and knowledge of the victim’s 
age is not required for a conviction under either § 2423(a) or § 
2251(a). Thus, the District Court did not err in prohibiting 
Tyson from asserting a mistake-of-age defense under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403.1 
 
A. 
 
The grand jury indicted Tyson for “knowingly 
transport[ing] [the victim], an[] individual who had not 
attained the age of 18 years, in interstate commerce, with the 
intent that [the victim] engage in prostitution” in violation of § 
2423(a). App. 15. The statute provides: 
 
A person who knowingly transports an 
individual who has not attained the age of 18 
years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any 
commonwealth, territory or possession of the 
United States, with the intent that the individual 
engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity 
for which any person can be charged with a 
criminal offense, shall be fined under this title 
and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 
 
§ 2423(a) (emphasis added). The District Court agreed with the 
Government’s position that Tyson need not have known the 
                                              
1 “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one 
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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victim’s age in order to have knowingly transported a minor. 
Tyson argues that the Government must prove the defendant’s 
knowledge of the victim’s age under § 2423(a). He points to 
the presumption that the mens rea requirement generally 
extends to each element of a criminal statute. 
 
In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, the Supreme Court 
explained that “courts ordinarily read a phrase in a criminal 
statute that introduces the elements of a crime with the word 
‘knowingly’ as applying that word to each element.” 556 U.S. 
646, 652 (2009).2 Even though the mens rea typically applies 
to all the elements, the majority recognized the existence of 
special contexts where courts may deviate from that general 
presumption. See id. 
 
Concurring, Justice Alito elaborated on examples of 
special contexts that rebut the general presumption. He 
specifically mentioned § 2423(a) as an example of a statute that 
calls for a contextual approach to statutory interpretation and 
added that circuit courts “uniformly [hold] that a defendant 
need not know the victim’s age to be guilty under [§2423(a)].” 
Id. at 660 (Alito, J., concurring). The Flores-Figueroa majority 
referenced Justice Alito’s concurrence with apparent approval. 
Id. at 652 (noting that sentences where “knowingly” only 
                                              
2 At issue in Flores-Figueroa was whether the term 
“knowingly” applies to all the elements in 18 U.S.C. § 
1028A(a)(1). The statute imposes a two-year sentence on 
individuals who “knowingly transfer[], possess[], or use[], 
without lawful authority, a means of identification of another 
person” during the commission of statutorily-defined felonies. 
§ 1028A(a)(1). 
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modifies a “transitive verb . . . typically involve special 
contexts . . . [a]s Justice ALITO notes, the inquiry into a 
sentence’s meaning is a contextual one”). Tyson does not 
provide a compelling reason for us to disregard Justice Alito’s 
concurrence and the majority’s recognition that the general 
presumption does not apply in all contexts. 
 
An overwhelming number of our sister circuits that 
have considered § 2423(a)—both prior to and after Flores-
Figueroa—have concluded that “knowingly” does not extend 
to the victim’s age.3 Interpreting a predecessor of § 2423(a), 
this Court held that “[t]he statute does not state or require 
knowledge of the victim’s age.” United States v. Hamilton, 456 
F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). While Tyson is 
correct that Hamilton is not controlling authority as to the 
current statutory provision, in light of Flores-Figueroa, we are 
unconvinced that we should alter our approach. 
 
Arguing that the background presumption articulated in 
Flores-Figueroa applies to § 2423(a), Tyson ignores 
Congress’s clear intent that knowledge of age not be required 
for a conviction pursuant to the statute. Our role in interpreting 
statutes is to “give effect to Congress’s intent.” Idahoan Fresh 
                                              
3 See, e.g., United States v. Lacy, 904 F.3d 889 (10th 
Cir. 2018); United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938 (4th Cir. 
2014); United States v. Tavares, 705 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Griffith, 284 F.3d 338 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor, 
239 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Daniels, 
685 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (discussing § 
2423(a) while interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)). 
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v. Advantage Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). 
“We . . . look to statutory context for evidence of congressional 
intent.” United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 92 (3d Cir. 
2015). In considering statutory context, courts interpret statutes 
in accordance with their overall scheme. Gundy v. United 
States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019). 
 
Congress did not intend to require knowledge of a 
victim’s age for a conviction under § 2423(a). Congress’s 
purpose in enacting and amending § 2423(a) was to provide 
minors special protection against sexual mistreatment. See 
Taylor, 239 F.3d at 997 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105–557 (1998)). 
In the face of longstanding consensus among circuit courts that 
knowledge of age is not an element of § 2423(a), Congress has 
not added language to the statute “requir[ing] the government 
to establish the defendant’s knowledge of the alleged victim’s 
age.” United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(noting that Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2423 nine times 
between 1978 and 2006). By not extending the mens rea 
requirement to the victim’s age, Congress eliminated 
offenders’ opportunity to prey on children without 
consequence by claiming ignorance of the victim’s age. Id. at 
540. A contrary interpretation would frustrate congressional 
intent to provide minors with heightened protection against 
sexual exploitation. 
 
The statute is best understood as establishing age as an 
aggravating factor that subjects defendants to increased 
penalties for conduct that is already prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2421.4 Aside from § 2423(a)’s focus on minors, § 2421 and 
                                              
4 Section 2421 criminalizes “knowingly transport[ing] 
any individual in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent 
 10 
 
§ 2423(a) are nearly identical. Cox, 577 F.3d at 837. As a 
result, those who transport individuals of any age across state 
lines to engage in prostitution are “already on notice that [they 
are] committing a crime.” Griffith, 284 F.3d at 351. Section 
2423(a) places the risk on perpetrators that the person they 
transport is a minor. Taylor, 239 F.3d at 977 (“As Congress 
intended, the age of the victim simply subjects the defendant 
to a more severe penalty in light of Congress’ concern about 
the sexual exploitation of minors.”). Requiring knowledge of 
age for a conviction under § 2423(a) would make it more 
difficult to prove sexual exploitation of a minor than an adult. 
See Washington, 743 F.3d at 942; Jones, 471 F.3d at 539; see 
also United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 227–28 (3d Cir. 
2012) (emphasizing that courts avoid absurd conclusions when 
interpreting statutes). Because knowledge of a minor’s age is 
not an element of § 2423(a), the lack of knowledge cannot be 
a defense. 
 
Tyson alternatively suggests that mistake of age is an 
affirmative defense to § 2423(a). However, the statute’s 
language does not create an affirmative mistake-of-age 
defense. Instead, § 2423 limits a mistake-of-age defense to a 
prosecution for a commercial sex act as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(f)(2). Id. § 2423(g) (“In a prosecution under this section 
based on . . . subsection (f)(2), it is a defense . . . that the 
defendant reasonably believed that the person with whom the 
defendant engaged in the commercial sex act had attained the 
age of 18 years.”). Section 2423(a) does not contain 
comparable language. The fact that Congress included a 
mistake-of-age defense for one subsection but not another 
                                              
that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any [criminal] 
sexual activity.”   
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indicates that Congress intended to limit the defense to the 
particular circumstance in § 2423(f)(2). 
 
Tyson next argues that § 2423(a) produces a piggyback 
offense requiring the Government to prove that he violated 
some other state or federal law. He suggests that we consider 
Pennsylvania’s law criminalizing prostitution of a minor. See 
18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5902(b.1)(3) (defining 
“knowingly promot[ing] prostitution of a minor”—including 
“encouraging, inducing or otherwise intentionally causing a 
minor to become or remain a prostitute”—as a third degree 
felony). Tyson invokes Pennsylvania law to claim that it 
provides a mistake-of-age defense and therefore, a mistake-of-
age defense to a charge under § 2423(a).5 
 
We do not adopt Tyson’s approach for two reasons. 
First, as the District Court noted, § 2423(a) criminalizes two 
categories of offenses: (1) engaging in prostitution and (2) 
engaging in any other sexual activity prohibited by state or 
federal law. Tyson was indicted on a prostitution charge rather 
than under the catch-all category.6 Adopting Tyson’s approach 
                                              
5 Tyson cites to statutory language providing that 
“[w]hen criminality depends on the child’s being below a 
critical age older than 14 years, it is a defense for the defendant 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she 
reasonably believed the child to be above the critical age.” 18 
Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3102. 
 
6 Tyson evokes the Seventh Circuit’s recognition that 
“Section 2423(a) creates a piggyback offense” requiring the 
Government to “show that the sexual activity after crossing the 
state line violated some other statute.” United States v. Ray, 
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would deprive the term “prostitution” of meaning since § 
2423(a) already prohibits sexual activity that constitutes a 
criminal offense. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 
(2001) (“[A] statute ought . . . to be so construed that . . . no 
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.”). 
 
Second, even if section 5902(b.1)(3) were to constitute 
the specific offense in this case, it does not provide a mistake-
of-age defense. Though Pennsylvania law does provide a 
mistake-of-age defense, it is limited to sexual offenses listed in 
Chapter 31 of Pennsylvania’s consolidated statutes. See § 3102 
(clarifying situations where the defense is available “in this 
chapter” for criminal conduct). Section 5902(b.1)(3), which is 
listed under Chapter 59, neither requires knowledge of age as 
an element of a prostitution offense nor provides a mistake-of-
age defense.7 
 
We join our sister circuits and hold that mistake of age 
is not a defense to § 2423(a) and that the Government is not 
required to prove knowledge of the victim’s age. Thus, the 
District Court did not err in concluding that mistake-of-age 
                                              
831 F.3d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 2016). However, unlike Tyson, the 
defendant in Ray was indicted for a state offense under § 
2423(a)’s catch-all category. See id. (“The indictment charged 
Ray with aggravated criminal sexual abuse, in violation of 720 
ILCS 5/11-1.60 . . . .”). 
 
7 Tyson acknowledged that Pennsylvania law does not 
recognize a mistake-of-age defense to the crime of prostitution. 
Oral Arg. at 10:48. 
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evidence is irrelevant to a prosecution pursuant to § 2423(a) 
and would likely mislead the jury. 
 
B. 
 
In addition to the § 2423(a) count, the grand jury 
indicted Tyson for knowingly using a minor to produce child 
pornography in violation of § 2251(a). The statute states: 
 
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, 
induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage 
in . . . or who transports any minor in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . with the intent 
that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit 
conduct for the purpose of producing any visual 
depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of 
transmitting a live visual depiction of such 
conduct, shall be punished as provided under 
subsection (e), if such person knows or has 
reason to know that such visual depiction will be 
transported or transmitted using any means or 
facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
mailed . . . or if such visual depiction has actually 
been transported or transmitted using any means 
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in 
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
mailed. 
 
§ 2251(a). In granting the Government’s motion in limine, the 
District Court concluded that “any evidence of mistake of age 
. . . is irrelevant” and would likely “confuse or mislead the 
jury” because the Government does not need to prove 
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knowledge of age under § 2251(a). App. 12–14. Tyson raises 
two arguments as to § 2251(a). First, he points to a perceived 
circuit split and lack of controlling authority on whether the 
Government must prove knowledge of age. Second, even if 
knowledge of age is not an element, Tyson argues that the First 
Amendment requires an affirmative mistake-of-age defense. 
 
Tyson claims that neither the Supreme Court nor this 
Court have definitely ruled on whether the Government must 
prove knowledge of age. In United States v. X-Citement Video, 
the Supreme Court analyzed § 2251(a) to clarify the meaning 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. The majority stated that child 
pornography “producers may be convicted under § 2251(a) 
without proof they had knowledge of age.” 513 U.S. 64, 76 n.5 
(1994); see also Cochran, 17 F.3d at 60–61 (concluding that § 
2252 requires knowledge of age after contrasting it with § 
2251(a)). While Tyson is correct that these cases consider § 
2251(a) in dicta, we nonetheless view them as persuasive 
authority. See In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“[W]e should not idly ignore considered statements the 
Supreme Court makes in dicta. The Supreme Court uses dicta 
to help control and influence the many issues it cannot decide 
because of its limited docket.”). 
 
To limit the persuasiveness of the § 2251(a) discussion 
in these cases, Tyson points to a supposed circuit split on the 
issue.8 Our sister circuits, however, have unequivocally held 
                                              
8 Tyson cites to decisions from the First and Ninth 
Circuits to support his argument that there exists a circuit split. 
See United States v. Encarnación-Ruiz, 787 F.3d 581 (1st Cir. 
2015); United States v. U.S. District Court (Kantor), 858 F.2d 
534 (9th Cir. 1988). We are unpersuaded. While Encarnación-
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that knowledge of age is not an element of § 2251(a).9 “In the 
wake of the X-Citement Video decision, all of the federal courts 
of appeals that have considered the issue of scienter under § 
2251(a) have held that a defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s 
age is not an element of the offense.” Humphrey, 608 F.3d at 
960. We see no reason to depart from this consensus. Because 
of § 2251(a)’s unambiguous text and history, we join our sister 
circuits and hold that the Government is not required to prove 
knowledge of age. 
 
The statute’s text and history indicate that Congress did 
not intend to require the Government to prove knowledge of 
age or provide defendants with an affirmative mistake-of-age 
defense. Malloy, 568 F.3d at 171–72. Indeed, Congress 
specifically removed “knowingly” from § 2251(a)’s age 
element to facilitate enforcement of laws prohibiting the 
production of child pornography. See Cochran, 17 F.3d at 60–
61 (discussing Congress’s decision to delete “knowingly” from 
                                              
Ruiz is limited to an “aider and abettor’s knowledge that the 
victim was a minor,” 787 F.3d at 584, Tyson was solely 
charged as a principal. Furthermore, Kantor explicitly states 
that knowledge is not an element of the statute. 858 F.2d at 538 
(“The defendant’s awareness of the subject’s minority is not an 
element of the offense.”). 
 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 634 F.3d 395 (7th  
Cir. 2011); United States v. Humphrey, 608 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Pliego, 578 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Malloy, 568 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Crow, 164 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 16 
 
a draft bill due to the Department of Justice’s concern that it 
would increase the difficulty of prosecuting child pornography 
producers).  
 
Criminal statutes aimed at protecting children from 
sexual offenses have long been considered exempt from the 
general scienter presumption. See Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 251 n.8 (1952) (“Exceptions [to the common law 
presumption] came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in 
which the victim’s actual age was determinative despite 
defendant’s reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of 
consent.”). Courts are particularly reluctant to impose a mens 
rea requirement to a minor’s age because the Government is 
“entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic 
depictions of children.” See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
756 (1982). 
 
Perhaps recognizing the lack of a textual or historical 
basis for a mistake-of-age defense, Tyson invites us to read an 
affirmative defense into the statute. He cites a Ninth Circuit 
decision holding that the First Amendment requires a mistake-
of-age defense to a prosecution under § 2251(a). Appellant’s 
Br. 16–18 (citing Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540). In that case, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “imposition of criminal 
sanctions on the basis of strict liability . . . would seriously chill 
protected speech.” Kantor, 858 F.2d at 540. Rather than 
invalidating the statute, the majority instead recognized an 
affirmative mistake-of-age defense. Id. at 542. We decline 
Tyson’s invitation to join the Ninth Circuit in recognizing an 
affirmative defense under the First Amendment. See 
Humphrey, 608 F.3d at 960 (noting that “the Ninth Circuit 
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stands alone in its determination that the First Amendment 
requires a reasonable mistake-of-age defense”).10 
 
We are unconvinced that excluding mistake-of-age 
evidence poses a substantial risk to protected expression. 
Perpetrators are well positioned to know the age of a victim 
because they “confront[] the underage victim personally.” X-
Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.2. As for legitimate 
producers, only a small subset of pornography—that which 
involves “youthful-looking” performers—can conceivably be 
subject to criminal prosecution under § 2251(a). Malloy, 568 
F.3d at 175–76. Most prosecutions involving this subset 
include performers that are undoubtedly children rather than 
adults that appear to be young. Id. at 176. In fact, producers are 
already required to verify the ages of performers. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2257(b)(1) (requiring producers to “ascertain . . . the 
performer’s name and date of birth”).   
 
Even if interpreting § 2251(a) to preclude mistake-of-
age evidence chills some protected speech, the risk is 
significantly outweighed by the Government’s compelling 
interest in protecting children from child pornography. 
“[S]afeguarding the physical and psychological well-being” of 
children is a compelling government interest. Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). 
                                              
10 Regardless, Kantor is of limited applicability to the 
issue at hand in this case. Kantor involved the production of a 
non-obscene film and was decided six years prior to the 
Supreme Court’s X-Citement Video decision. Kantor, 858 F.2d 
at 538 (“[N]o one claims that [the film] is obscene; the film 
would therefore enjoy the protection of the [F]irst 
[A]mendment were it not for its depiction of a minor.”). 
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Here, Tyson recorded a video of the underage victim 
performing oral sex on him. Section § 2251(a) was enacted 
precisely to protect children from the conduct Tyson engaged 
in. After all, “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, 
upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into 
full maturity as citizens.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 168 (1944). 
 
We hold that mistake of age is not a defense to § 2251(a) 
because knowledge is not an element of the offense. The statute 
also does not contain an affirmative mistake-of-age defense, 
and such a defense is not mandated by the Constitution. 
Therefore, the District Court did not err in excluding mistake-
of-age evidence.  
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we will 
affirm the District Court’s grant of the Government’s motion 
in limine precluding mistake-of-age evidence. 
